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Abstract
This paper studies liquidity risk contagion within the interbank market by
assessing the long-run relationship of short-term interest rate spreads from
January 2002 to December 2015. In particular, we model the interaction
between the LIBOR-OIS spread, euro fixed-float OIS swap rate and the three-
month US-German bond spread and discover strong evidence of structural
innovations affecting the interbank market. We find that when the short-term
interbank market is affected by a liquidity shock, the LIBOR-OIS spread is
a leader in moving back to equilibrium, while the euro-dollar currency swap
rate and the US-German bond spreads are followers. Moreover, we find
long-run cointegrating relationships and bi-directional causality between the
spreads. However, structural breaks identified as prospective financial crises
affect the long-run relationships and liquidity shocks drive interbank rates
and spread fluctuations. Therefore, liquidity shocks propagating within the
interbank market can forecast benchmark interest movements, and ultimately
this has significant implications for policy-makers and market players alike.
Keywords: Contagion, Financial Crises, Interbank Market, Liquidity
shocks, Structural breaks
JEL classification: C32, G15
1. Introduction
This paper studies liquidity risk contagion within the short-term inter-
bank market in times of financial market turmoil. During the early stages of
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the financial crisis of 2007-08, liquidity risk observed in one market quickly
spilled over to neighbouring markets. Identifying liquidity shocks with desta-
bilising effects on the short-term market well before they propagate and
spread is paramount in both crisis management and preventing market down-
turns. According to economic theory interbank linkages determine how liq-
uidity risk moves from one market to another (Upper and Worms, 2004).
However, the theory does not explain how economic and financial variables
are interconnected and how shocks originating from equilibrium relationships
drive liquidity risk spillovers.
Illiquidity contagion between leading financial institutions caused by the
2007-08 credit crisis highlights the importance of identifying causality, equi-
librium relationships and structural breaks within the short-term interbank
market. If rates and spreads move independently in the long-run, they are
said to follow a random walk and rates and spread dynamics are unpre-
dictable. However, if rates and spreads are interconnected and move in a
synchronised fashion, we gain crucial insights into the propagation of liquid-
ity shocks within the interbank market. Moreover, looking in depth at the
interaction between the money market spreads before and during a financial
crisis, one can understand in what way structural breaks affect equilibrium
relationships and what are the implications for the smooth functioning of the
interbank market in terms of liquidity crisis prevention and forecasting.
There are several motivations for conducting our investigation. First,
we intend to determine whether the LIBOR-OIS spread, the three-month
US-German bond spread and the euro fixed-float OIS swap are interdepen-
dent and whether some of the variables cause changes in others. If that is
the case, then one can predict movements in benchmark short-term inter-
bank spreads and rates, anticipate unfavourable financial events unfolding
and prevent them if counteracting policy interventions are introduced. Sec-
ond, if liquidity shocks affect the short-term interbank market, one is able
to trace the forecast error variance of the variables of interest to reveal what
exactly drives movements in benchmark spreads and rates. Third, if long-run
equilibrium relationships exist among the time series, this would reveal that
significant (liquidity) shocks may translate into extreme financial events as
witnessed during the financial crisis of 2007-08. Last, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the progression of interbank spread variability is believed to be ex-
ogenous. Hence, it is assumed that interest rate variability is not conditional
on shocks evolving from within the rates under investigation, nor on the ac-
tions of financial institutions or other market players. When the interbank
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market is not in turmoil, this view is rather benign. However, in crisis periods
when information and beliefs are more likely to become homogenous, related
interest rates behave in a similar fashion. In such cases, liquidity shocks are
amplified from within the system as part of some self-fulfilling forecasts or
endogenous responses (Dan´ıelsson, 2011). Thus, our study shows that en-
dogenous structural innovations within established equilibrium relationships
explain the forecast error variance of the other time series.
Since 2008, the literature has focused on assessing liquidity risk and trad-
ing behaviour during financial distress, whereas the empirical literature on
contagion is surprisingly limited considering the importance of the subject.
Besides, the majority of the empirical financial crisis literature (Upper and
Worms (2004); Upper (2011); Mistrulli (2011); Gorton and Metrick (2012),
among others) disregard the important characteristics of short-term money
market series, such as stationarity, normality and structural changes in the
constant term, mean and variance. Whereas Upper (2011) highlights the im-
portance of assessing contagion in order to maintain the smooth functioning
and safeguard the stability of the financial system, we aim to advance the
literature and reveal important dynamics of liquidity risk contagion within
the interbank market.
Our study assesses the long-run behaviour of short-term interest rates and
spreads in times of financial turmoil. Geographically, we concentrate on the
European and US interbank market providing a comprehensive analysis of
the behaviour of leading interbank indicators. Prior to establishing the long-
run equilibrium relationships, interdependencies and causality are revealed
by following how interbank spreads evolve over time. Vector Autoregression
(VAR) identifies whether lagged values of covariates have any effect on each
other. The Impulse Response Function (IRF) is used to trace shocks to
the forecast error variance. The structural VAR coefficients and Cholesky
elements provide efficient parameter estimates revealing a strong evidence of
structural innovations affecting the interbank market.3 Moreover, we find
long-run cointegrating relationships and bi-directional causality between the
spreads. However, structural breaks identified as prospective financial crises
affect the long-run relationships and liquidity shocks drive the interbank-rate
3Also called Cholesky factorisation, the method was developed by Andre´-Louis
Cholesky to decompose the correlation matrix into parameters or correlated values. The
method was introduced in the business cycle analysis literature by Sims (1980).
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and spread fluctuations.
Our investigation contributes to the literature in several ways. The
spreads that are used to construct liquidity measures in earlier analyses omit-
ted the fact that these time series are not stationary in their levels, and
therefore are integrated of order one (I(1)). Once the series are I(1), gener-
ally they are also cointegrated. Consequently, it can be argued that previous
analyses’ results are questionable due to the use of inadequate economet-
ric tools in assessing liquidity risk and contagion in general. The interval
January 2002 to December 2015 covers a longer time period, and not only
the period surrounding the latest financial crisis as the majority of studies
consider. We show that if structural shocks affect the interbank market, the
LIBOR-OIS spread is first, whereas the euro fixed-float OIS swap and the
US-German bond spread are followers in adjusting back into equilibrium. At
the same time, our analysis projects the magnitude and effects of liquidity
shocks on other spreads and interest rates. Last, our study reveals structural
changes and their permanent effect in the identified long-run and short-run
equilibrium relationships.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a
literature review concerning liquidity risk and contagion. Section 3 presents
the data and methodology. Empirical results are reported in Section 4, while
Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
Both the academic literature and financial industry acknowledge that
the dynamics of financial crises are fuelled by the propagation of liquidity
shocks and subsequent contagion to neighbouring markets and regions. The
financial crisis of 2007-08 highlights the importance of market contagion and
its association to the structure of connections among financial institutions
and their funding maturity. Market failures are the result of propagation of
liquidity shocks across financial markets, whereas contagion is seen as the
most important aspect of market breakdowns. When a crisis develops, only
some institutions or a certain section of the economy is affected, however
shocks rapidly propagate to the rest of the financial sector and eventually
damage the wider economy. A small liquidity shock in the money market
has the potential for a self-fulfilling anticipation of a crisis.
The following sections summarise the literature which focuses on liquidity
risk, financial crises and domino effects in the short-term interbank market.
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We first discuss the theoretical literature which centres on the intermedia-
tion process in the presence of frictions (imperfect competition, for example),
constraints (funding, for example), information asymmetry and shocks which
affect the price formation, decision and behaviour of agents. Second, a sum-
mary of the empirical literature is presented where we identify two strands of
literature: one looks at financial crises and the propagation of shocks from a
market microstructure view-point, and the other decomposes the dynamics
of contagion into liquidity elements. Last, we discuss LIBOR manipulation
and its likely effect on the magnitude of the recent credit crisis.
2.1. Theoretical models of contagion and financial crises
The theoretical literature assumes that the system overall is either dy-
namic or static, and the intermediation process is modelled as an equilibrium
process. Overall, the focus of these analyses is on how trade and finan-
cial sector links affect the dynamics of contagion in the international bank
trade, lending and hedging context. According to Brunnermeier and Oehmke
(2012), there are two well defined stages that play a significant role in the
development of financial crises. The first one is the run-up stage in which
bubbles and imbalances develop. The second stage is the crisis stage in which
the risk accrued in the previous stage materialises. The authors emphasise
the importance of an amplification mechanism (in the form of a self-fulfilling
loop) in the development of the crisis. There are two channels which aid the
feedback mechanism. The direct channel is initiated by direct business rela-
tionships (interconnectedness of markets, for example), whereas the indirect
channel is induced by contagion (such as bank runs or domino effects, for
example), or externalities caused by endogenous reactions of market players.
To understand the process of contagion, Allen and Gale (2000) focus on a sin-
gle channel contagion model of liquidity preference, which provides different
outcomes depending on whether the market is complete or not. The aim is to
understand how cross-holding of deposits in different segments and regions of
the banking system actually govern the dynamics of spillovers. In contrast,
He and Krishnamurthy (2011) expand their setting to an infinite-horizon
while modelling intermediation relationships within the financial system in
the presence of shocks.
Allen et al. (2009) identify two approaches of dealing with contagion. Ac-
cording to the first approach, Nier et al. (2007), Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and
Gai and Kapadia (2010) among others, evaluate systemic risk by analysing
direct interbank linkages. These investigations use networks to simulate and
5
  
assess the effects of shocks to the financial system. Upper and Worms (2004),
Furfine (2003) and Mistrulli (2011) among others, apply balance sheet data
to assess interbank contagion. For the second approach, Cifuentes et al.
(2005) study indirect balance-sheet linkages within the banking system. Shin
(2008) develops a theoretical lattice based market microstructure framework
which integrates responses from asset price variations and contagion effects
among market participants. Kodres and Pritsker (2002) note that global di-
versification due to internationally traded assets (which often share a high
correlation) can be channels of cross-regional contagion. Allen et al. (2010)
develop a two-period network model to assess how banks which interact with
each other react to a shock (bad news, for example), and find that there
is a higher probability for debt to be rolled over or being defaulted in an
unclustered network than in a clustered one. An important implication is
that systemic risk - as a result of contagion - is influenced by the structure
of financial networks.
2.2. Empirical models of contagion and financial crises
According to economic theory, the risk of contagion is determined by the
way financial institutions are linked with each other, thus financial conta-
gion can be modelled as an equilibrium phenomenon (Allen and Gale, 2000;
Freixas et al., 2000; Allen et al., 2010; Makarov and Plantin, 2013). Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2000) analyse whether the dynamics of contagion are explained
by market fundamentals or herding behaviour, and find that contagion is re-
gional rather than global and that one country experiencing financial distress
cannot forecast a crisis elsewhere. This is in sharp contrast to the findings
of Eichengreen et al. (1996), who believe that currency crisis spillovers are
prevalent primarily between countries which are associated via commercial
trade links. Moreover, due to the complexity of regional contagion, it is hard
to distinguish whether trade links or financial interconnectedness spreads
crises from one region to the other.4
Some argue that empirical market microstructure provides a foundation
for investigating price development and informational relationships in finan-
cial markets, which is paramount in describing and understanding financial
crises. Dan´ıelsson and Saltog˘lu (2003) investigate the short-lived liquidity
4Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) argue that due to the fact that trade is more intra-
regional rather than inter-regional, financial contagion is contained within a (larger) region
and rarely becomes global.
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crisis of December 2000 which struck the Turkish overnight market and show
that an institutional level order flow model provides an insight and detailed
explanation of decision making in an elaborate way. Hartmann et al. (2001)
investigate the microstructure of the overnight Euro money market, specifi-
cally looking at monetary policy changes and their effect on intra-day trading
patterns. The authors prove that monetary policy changes are mirrored in
the widening of spreads, and increased volatility is the result of noisy market
behaviour. Hui et al. (2011) claim that the spillover of the crisis from the US
to the European market was moderate between the period mid-2007 to mid-
2008, and funding liquidity risk played a major part in the development of
the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis of 2007-08, the authors
find considerable deviations from covered interest rate parity and argue that
the widening of the LIBOR-OIS spread mainly reflects funding liquidity risk
in the interbank market, and subsequently it can be used to measure fund-
ing liquidity conditions. This view is supported by McAndrews et al. (2008)
who claim that the spread undeniably contains a significant and time-varying
funding liquidity element. Moreover, the LIBOR-OIS spread incorporates
counterparty-risk premia, which originates from the counterparty’s inability
to pay back an interbank loan.
Baba et al. (2008) analyse the crisis spillover to the foreign exchange (FX)
and long-term cross currency basis swap markets for the period July 2007 to
January 2008. The authors argue that the departure from interest rate parity
conditions is due to non-US financial institutions’ use of the swap markets to
survive US dollar deficiencies they encountered during the crisis. Gorton and
Metrick (2012) trace the spillover of the credit crunch by investigating the
causes of repo haircuts to find that fluctuations in the interbank LIBOR-OIS
spread were correlated with increases in the non-subprime securitised assets
and associated derivatives spreads. Other analyses argue that the LIBOR-
OIS spread encompasses credit and liquidity risk premia (McAndrews et al.,
2008; Michaud and Upper, 2008; Sengupta and Tam, 2008; Hui et al., 2011).
Schwarz (2014) finds that during the first half of the credit crisis of 2007-08,
more than 60% of widening of both the one and three-month Euro LIBOR-
OIS spreads and the Eurozone sovereign debt spreads can be accredited to
market liquidity effects.5 Frank et al. (2008) test the diffusion of liquid-
5Widening risk spreads can be explained by greater compensation claimed by risk-
averse investors in case of default. Alternatively, it can be described as a compensation
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ity shocks across US financial markets and find that there was a significant
connection between markets and funding liquidity pressure which reached
its peak right before the global crisis hit. In times of equilibrium, market
illiquidity shocks are fundamentally short-lived, as these give prospects for
traders to gain profits and subsequently enhance liquidity and the price dis-
covery process. Contrarily however, in times of distress, systemic risk is
being created by liquidity shocks which intensify and spread across financial
markets. Zhou and He (2012) propose a new contagion-MGARCH model
by introducing a new contagion equation which can capture the clustering
feature of the risk contagion process. Chau and Deesomsak (2014) develop
a financial stress spillover index with time-varying components to trace the
source of systemic risk in the US equity, debt, banking, and Forex markets.
On the other hand, Smimou and Khallouli (2016) focus on the Eurozone
and UK equity market while tracing liquidity risk spillover during the global
financial crisis.
The study of contagion has important implications for bank regulations
and the development of safety nets when confronting liquidity shocks. Guo
et al. (2011) assess the magnitude of economic shocks at aggregate level, and
their ensuing contagion between the stock market, real estate, credit default
swap (CDS) and energy market during the global financial crisis. The au-
thors argue that regime switches are more frequent at the start of the crisis,
and that the stock market and oil price shocks induce the fluctuations ob-
served in the CDS and stock markets in general. Upper and Worms (2004)
and Mistrulli (2011) analyse balance sheet information of banks to approx-
imate a matrix of bilateral credit links and assess whether the collapse of a
bank can lead to contagion. The focus of these studies is on the spillover
effect caused by interbank linkages in the presence or absence of safety nets.
However the main limitation of such arguments is that these studies solely
look at domestic banks and therefore cross-border channels for spillover are
not assessed. Upper (2011) evaluates methodologies based on simulation
techniques, yet these analyses do not contribute to assessing bank policies,
nor can they be applied to perform stress testing in the banking sector.
for investors holding less liquid securities.
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2.3. The LIBOR manipulation and its likely effect on the magnitude of fi-
nancial crisis of 2007-08
The reliability of the US LIBOR rate came under fire in June 2012 when
Barclays Bank, UBS, RBS, and Rabobank allegedly under-reported their
borrowing costs (Hou and Skeie, 2014). This raises questions over the sta-
bility of the financial system, robustness and effectiveness of reference rates,
and credibility of financial regulators (Gyntelberg and Wooldridge, 2008).
Bank losses during 2007 compelled banks to revise their liquidity needs and
prompted the British Bankers’ Association to raise monitoring on LIBOR
setting (Mackenzie and Tett, 2008). It is believed that throughout several
years, participating banks submitted lower rates in order to conceal funding
problems, which contrasted true market conditions (Mollenkamp and White-
house, 2008; Wiseman, 2008). Distorted LIBOR rates may have an adverse
effect on economy-wide financial settings; unreliable rates transfer risk and
pricing errors across financial markets, thus generating uncertainty and im-
pairing the power of central banks to mitigate financial distress (BIS, 2013).
The majority of the literature investigates banks’ LIBOR quotes. Fouquau
and Spieser (2015) looks at LIBOR submission of participating banks and
find breaks which are matched to real key events in a three-regime threshold
regression model. The results on an agglomerative hierarchical clustering
analysis reveal that certain banks grouped in cartels manipulated LIBOR
rates. Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012) use screening techniques to identify anti-
competitive behaviour among the participating banks, and analyse individ-
ual quotes versus CDS rates. In spite of the fact that quotes display unusual
patterns, the authors find that Libor rates were not manipulated during the
period 2007-2008.
Both academia and industry recognize that the LIBOR manipulation is
an issue, however due to the fact that there are no specific details about the
extent of the manipulation, or how long it was going on, one cannot control
for it or test to reveal whether it impacts on the magnitude of the financial
crisis of 2007-08.
Our study complements the empirical literature which focuses on liquidity
risk contagion and financial crisis in the interbank market. The majority of
analyses assess the effects of shocks through interbank links or decompose
financial risk into risk elements, however little is known about the dynamics
of structural shocks, i.e. how these move between markets and how quickly
interbank spreads affected by liquidity shocks adjust back into equilibrium.
The novelty of our analysis is that contagion and propagation of liquidity
9
  
shocks is assessed by implementing a series of alternative techniques, such
as structural VAR (which isolates estimates of individual shock behaviour)
and cointegration methods which reveal detailed characteristics of short-term
interbank rates and spreads. Moreover, our investigation spans over a longer
period of time as opposed to the majority of literature which looks in isolation
at specific economic or financial events (such as market crashes).
3. Methodology and data
Essentially, our study builds a methodological analysis of leading short-
term rates and spreads to determine causality, linear interdependencies, equi-
librium relationships and structural changes in the short-term interbank mar-
ket. We first present the data, then the methods used in our analysis. The
ultimate aim is to reveal whether liquidity shocks spill-over within the short-
term interbank market and whether liquidity shocks disturb the established
long-run equilibrium relationships.
3.1. Data
The data set is constructed with historical closing daily spread between
the US LIBOR and overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate (LIBOR-OIS), the
daily three-month US-German bond spread (USGer3M) and the daily three-
month euro fixed-float OIS swap rate (EUSWEC). The data covers the period
of 1st January 2002 to 31th December 2015, thereby including the pre- and
post-crisis period with the possibility of structural breaks in the time series.
The reason for using longitudinal and cross-sectional money market inter-
est rates and spreads is that these carry a liquidity component (premia) on
term unsecured interbank loans. Moreover, banks are interconnected cross-
regionally, primarily due to cross-ownership of financial institutions. In tur-
bulent market conditions, all the spreads used in the present study are good
indicators of risk premiums as a result of credit, funding-liquidity, default,
Forex, and ultimately systemic risk. Moreover, the spreads reflect movements
in interest rates of the two significant geographical markets affected by the
financial crisis of 2007-08, that is the Eurozone and US market.
The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is used as a reference rate
in financial contracts all over the world and is the rate at which banks and
institutions of similar size agree to lend each other. The rate is paid on
unsecured interbank loans of various maturities (up to 12 months). Changes
in the LIBOR rate can be attributed primarily to open market operations
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implemented by central banks in order to re-price short-term loans between
banks. Increases in LIBOR rates can be credited to banks calling for greater
compensation in case of default risk on their loans. The Overnight Interest
Swap rate (OIS) is the rate of the derivative contract on the federal funds
rate, and in usual market circumstances is generally below the LIBOR rate.
The term LIBOR-OIS spread has the role of evaluating the health of banks,
for it mirrors the risk linked with lending to other banks. In times of financial
distress, the LIBOR-OIS spread is a fitting indicator of risk premiums as a
result of credit and funding liquidity risk (McAndrews et al., 2008; Hui et al.,
2011). Alan Greenspan advocates that the LIBOR-OIS spread is an indicator
of alarm for bank insolvency, and inflated spread levels reveal struggles in the
banking industry. Moreover, fluctuations in the LIBOR-OIS spread convey
changes in risk premiums (which are caused by a decrease in the rate of
default-risk-free asset compared to the rate of the risky asset) rather than in
liquidity premiums, which in turn mirror banks’ need for liquidity (Thornton,
2009). Besides, the spread includes counterparty-risk premia which originate
from the counterparty’s ability to pay back an interbank loan. Moreover, the
spread contains a significant and time-varying funding liquidity element, as
McAndrews et al. (2008) point out. In times of increased uncertainty, such
as in financial distress caused by a credit crisis, increase in the risk premium
is caused by a decrease in the rate of default-risk-free asset compared to the
rate of the risky asset. Such scenario would induce investors to claim their
assets from banks, resulting in deposits’ flight to safety.
The second variable used in our study is the daily spread between the
three-month US and German government bond rate. Any deviation between
the US and German government bond rate is mirrored in varying future eco-
nomic development and interest-rate outlook for the two economies. Funda-
mentally, different economic and monetary policies between the two biggest
economies drive the widening or narrowing of the spread (Cappiello et al.,
2006). Correspondingly, US and Euro-zone country specific debt and job
market prospects influence US-German bond spread fluctuations (Goldberg
and Leonard, 2003). The US and German Government bonds carry no risk
(theoretically), as they are considered the two safest assets in the world.
The euro fixed-float OIS swap in which the floating leg is centred on the
Euro Over-night Index Average (EONIA) rate, is calculated as the weighted
average of all overnight unsecured dealings. Fundamentally, the euro fixed-
float OIS swap is the reflection of the interbank risk premium (Alter and
Beyer, 2014). The nominal quantity contracted is in euros, yet only interest
11
  
cash flows are traded at expiration.
3.2. Interdependence and causality of short-term money market rates
Before investigating interdependence and causality among the series, the
assumption of stationarity must be assessed and consequently the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) (1992)
tests are implemented. If the series are stationary in their levels, then they
are possibly cointegrated and share a common stochastic trend. After deter-
mining whether the series have a unit root, interdependencies and causality
can be determined. Let Yt = (y1t, y2t, y3t) denote a (3× 1) vector of variables
representing the LIBOR-OIS, the EUSWEC and the USGer3M series, with
t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Considering that there are three time series in the system,
there will be three equations to be solved. The covariates in the three equa-
tions are the lagged values of all three time series. Therefore, in the VAR
system, the time path of the LIBOR-OIS time series is determined by current
and past realisations of the EUSWEC and USGer3M series. Similarly, the
time path of the EUSWEC time series is influenced by current and past re-
alisations of the LIBOR-OIS and USGer3M series, and finally the time path
of the USGer3M time series is affected by current and past realisations of the
EUSWEC and LIBOR-OIS series. The lagged values of the series are weakly
exogenous, thus the model does not violate the endogeneity assumption. For
every single equation there will be 13 parameters to be estimated. The null
hypothesis assumes that the coefficients of the model are jointly zero.
To see the adjustment course of the three time series and to assess how
each shock to the forecast error variance feeds back, the IRF is implemented.
Due to the fact that the VAR system is under-identified (primitive), at this
stage the impulse response functions are only plotted, however one is unable
to identify and determine the course and effects of the shocks.
These functions are used later in the Cholesky decomposition along with
further restrictions to produce the effects of the structural shocks (LIBOR−OISt ,
EUSWECt and USGer3Mt) have on the short-term interbank market - that is
to precisely identify leaders and followers in aligning back into equilibrium in
the short-term interbank market. At this moment the system introduces an
ordering of the variables, and in every single equation one of the time series
is exogenous. For example, if LIBOR−OISt shocks do not explain the fore-
cast error variance of the yUSGer3Mt spread for all predicted time sequences,
then the yUSGer3Mt series is said to be exogenous and therefore progresses
freely from LIBOR−OISt shocks and from the yLIBOR−OISt spread. However,
12
  
if the LIBOR−OISt shocks account for all the forecast error variance in the
yUSGer3Mt spread for all predicted time sequences, the yUSGer3Mt spread would
be absolutely endogenous. Knowing the estimated VAR parameters and the
elements of the variance/covariance matrix, one can decompose the vector of
innovations/shocks into impulse responses, as follows. The restrictions apply
to both matrices A and B.
A t = B et (1)
where A is a lower triangular restricted matrix and B is a diagonal re-
stricted covariance matrix of structural shocks Σ, which implies that shocks
to the LIBOR-OIS spread are not correlated with shocks to the EUSWEC
or to the USGer3M spreads. t are the structural shocks and et are the VAR
innovations.
To find out whether there is causality among the series, the pairwise
Granger causality method (1969) is implemented on the VAR estimates. The
method tests whether the past values of the LIBOR-OIS spread produce
statistically significant information about the EUSWEC spread, for example.
The Wald-test (1951), as the basis of the Granger causality method, is a joint
hypothesis test that the coefficients on all lags are jointly equal to zero. The
VAR residuals are tested for serial correlation using the Durbin-Watson test
(1950) and for a unit root.
3.3. Testing for structural breaks with cointegrated variables
The Johansen cointegration test (1995) can be implemented solely if the
time series have the same level of integration. Johansen’s maximum likeli-
hood framework (1988) based on the trace test is used to find the cointegrat-
ing vectors and relationships. The lag selection criteria is based on the Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (BIC),
and Hanna-Quinn information criterion (HQIC). An unrestricted cointegra-
tion test along with four restricted cointegration tests are implemented, as
shown below.
1. Unrestricted trend - this implies that there are quadratic terms in the
levels of the LIBOR-OIS, EUSWEC and USGer3M spreads. Moreover,
the cointegrating relationships are stationary.
2. Restricted trend - the trends in the spreads are linear, thus the cointe-
grating relationships are trend stationary.
13
  
3. Unrestricted constant - there are linear trends in the differenced series
and the relationships are limited to being stationary with a constant
mean.
4. Restricted constant - there are no linear trends in the levels of the
differenced LIBOR-OIS, USGer3M and EUSWEC series. The cointe-
grating relationships will have a constant mean, however there won’t
be trends or constants in the equations.
5. No trend - there are no trends in the relationships. The differences
and levels of the series have zero means.
After the short-run and long-run relationships are established, the Gregory-
Hansen cointegration method (1996) is implemented to test for the presence
of structural breaks or regime switches. We’re interested to see whether po-
tential long-run equilibrium relationships are disturbed by liquidity crashes
observed within the short-term interbank market. We argue that the struc-
tural innovations identified by the decomposition of the error terms are es-
sentially liquidity crashes. If the cointegrating vector changes at a single
unknown time, the series may return to equilibrium and a linear combina-
tion of the series becomes stationary. This test allows for serial correlation
among the innovations. A dummy is included in the system of regressions,
which identifies a one-time regime shift in the intercept and slope coefficients.
The conventional ADF test would not suffice in view of the cointegrating
vector shifting at an unknown point in time. The null hypothesis of no coin-
tegration is tested against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration with
level shift/structural break/regime shift at a single unknown time. The three
models of cointegration with structural breaks are as follows:
A Structural break in the level
y1t = µ1 + µ2 φtτ + αy2t + γy3t + t (2)
where y1t represents the USGer3M spread, µ1 is the intercept previous
to a shift, µ2 represents the change in the intercept at the moment of
the shift.6 α refers to the cointegrating slope coefficient for y2t (which
6The USGer3M bond spread is used as the dependent variable based on our findings
in Section 4.2 (see Table 4).
14
  
is the LIBOR-OIS spread) and γ represents the cointegrating slope
coefficient for y3t (which represents the EUSWEC rate); t = 1, . . . , n
and τ ∈ (0, 1) is the unidentified parameter and represents the relative
timing of the break point; it can only take integer values. The error
term satisfies t ∼ N(0, σ2). The dummy or indicator variable, which
has the role of accounting for fluctuations in the constant term and
slope coefficients, possesses the following features:
φtτ =
{
0, if t ≤ [nτ ],
1, if t > [nτ ].
(3)
B Level shift with trend
y1t = µ1 + µ2 φtτ + βt+ αy2t + γy3t + t (4)
Beside the change in the intercept, a shift in the slope vector β is
allowed. α refers to the cointegrating slope coefficient for the LIBOR-
OIS spread and γ represents the cointegrating slope coefficient for the
EUSWEC spread; t = 1, . . . , n and t ∼ N(0, σ2).
C Regime shift
y1t = µ1 + µ2 φtτ + α1 y2t + α2 y2t φtτ+
γ1 y3t + γ2 y3t φtτ + t (5)
where α1 refers to the cointegrating slope coefficients for the LIBOR-
OIS spread before the regime shift and α2 represents the change in
slope coefficients. γ1 refers to the cointegrating slope coefficients for the
EUSWEC spread before the regime shift and γ2 represents the change
in the EUSWEC rate after a regime change has occured. t = 1, . . . , n
and t ∼ N(0, σ2).
4. Empirical results
The section below provides summary statistics, then Section 4.2 presents
the results of the VAR, structural VAR and Granger causality test. Finally,
Section 4.3 presents the cointegration test results.
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4.1. Summary statistics
There are 3651 observations for each of the three variables. Owing to the
fact that the data changes persistently, it is hard to find a measure of central
tendency for the entire length of the analysed time interval. Table 1 presents
the summary statistics of the LIBOR-OIS, EUSWEC and USGer3M time
series. The point estimate of the LIBOR-OIS spread is 25.56, with minimum
and maximum values ranging between 1.91 - 364.42. The variation around
the mean is high with a value of 34.93. The mean and standard deviation for
the EUSWEC and USGer3M spreads are close to zero and one, respectively;
the minimum and maximum values are in much narrower interval. All three
time series are skewed to the right and they are peaked around the mean,
with the LIBOR-OIS spread showing an amplified excess kurtosis. The plots
of the daily time series (see Figure 1) show stochastic trends, that is they
increase and decrease over time. The top panel of Figure 1 is particularly
interesting, for it depicts the financial crisis of 2007-08. A closer inspection
of panel two and three reveal a similar behaviour.
Table 1: Summary statistics of the LIBOR-OIS, USGer3M and EUSWEC spreads.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis ADF (p values)
USLIBOIS 25.560 34.93 1.91 364.42 4.52 30.75 -2.60 (0.09)
USGer3M -0.121 1.00 -3.07 2.20 0.07 3.13 -1.37 (0.60)
EUSWEC 1.623 1.44 -0.28 4.35 0.37 1.74 -0.73 (0.84)
diff. USLIBOIS 0.002 2.85 -39.65 37.55 0.38 71.35 -54.28 (0.00)
diff. USGer3M 0.0004 0.06 -0.97 0.88 -0.66 53.66 -59.00 (0.00)
diff. EUSWEC -0.0009 0.02 -0.29 0.19 -2.89 53.68 -57.17 (0.00)
The ADF test confirms (see Table 1) that the variables contain a unit
root, and therefore are stationary in their levels. The KPSS test for sta-
tionarity (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) confirms that the spreads are not trend
stationary. At this time, it is essential to modify the time series to permit
a reliable evaluation of the relationships among the spreads. As data in the
lower half of Table 1 shows, the mean values of all three series get close to
zero. The KPSS test corroborates the ADF test results, thus first differencing
the time series produces a mean-reverting process.
4.2. VAR, Structural VAR and Granger causality
At the moment, there is no information on which of the three time series
is exogenous. All three variables are treated symmetrically in the VAR sys-
tem. The AIC, HQIC and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion suggest
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Figure 1: Behaviour of the LIBOR-OIS, EUSWEC and USGer3M time series for the period
1st January 2002 to 30th December 2015.
that the optimal lag is four. The configuration of the VAR(4) system con-
tains impulse responses (or feedback), as a result that the LIBOR-OIS, the
EUSWEC and the USGer3M spreads and their lags are permitted to interact
with and influence each other.
The VAR(4) results are presented in Table 2. The null hypothesis that
jointly the coefficients are zero is rejected. It can be concluded that the
LIBOR-OIS spread is a good predictor of changes in the EUSWEC spread.
At 5% significance level, for every unit increase in the first lagged LIBOR-OIS
spread a 0.0003 unit increase in the EUSWEC spread is predicted. Similarly,
the USGer3M spread is a good predictor of changes in the EUSWEC rate.
For every unit increase in the fourth lag of the USGer3M spread a 0.0118
unit decrease in the EUSWEC spread is predicted. Furthermore, for every
unit increase in the first lagged EUSWEC spread a -9.3069 unit decrease
in the LIBOR-OIS spread is predicted. It seems that various lags of some
17
  
Table 2: VAR(4) estimates for the LIBOR-OIS, EUSWEC and USGer3M spreads.
Main D.USLIBOIS D.USGer3M D.EUSWEC
LD.USLIBOIS 0.06*** 0.0009* 0.0003***
(3.52) (2.59) (2.93)
L2D.USLIBOIS 0.12*** -0.0002 0.0001
(7.50) (-0.76) (1.42)
L3D.USLIBOIS 0.14*** -0.0009* 0.0003***
(8.40) (-2.51) (-3.18)
L4D.USLIBOIS 0.06*** 0.0004 0.00
(3.95) (1.25) (-0.38)
LD.EUSWEC -9.31*** 0.38*** 0.05***
(-3.73) (6.53) (2.79)
L2D.EUSWEC -24.80 -0.11 0.16***
(-9.90) (-1.95) (9.40)
L3D.EUSWEC 8.99*** 0.03 -0.005
(3.55) (0.52) (-0.30)
L4D.EUSWEC 12.36*** 0.10** 0.13***
(4.89) (1.65) (7.85)
LD.USGer3M -11.50*** 0.03 -0.01***
(-16.16) (1.67) (-2.78)
L2D.USGer3M 0.96 0.02 0.00
(1.30) (1.21) (0.02)
L3D.USGer3M 1.28 0.002 -0.02***
(1.74) (0.10) (-4.58)
L4D.USGer3M 3.38*** -0.09*** -0.01*
(4.60) (-5.42) (-2.05)
*** p <0.05, ** p <0.1, * p <0.01
of the variables have an ex-post effect on the present observations of the
other two. This might be accredited to the fact that a single shock may
last several periods as a result of autoregressive attributes of the time series.
Another explanation is that a shock’s effect is not experienced in its full force
instantaneously, but after some time has lapsed. For example, for every unit
increase in the forth lagged EUSWEC rate a 0.0967 unit increase in the
USGer3M spread is predicted.
The residuals of the regressions are stationary as supported by the ADF
and KPSS tests. Moreover, the residuals are not correlated as confirmed by
the Durbin-Watson test. The stability condition of the VAR(4) parameters
18
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Figure 2: Impulse response function of the coefficients after fitting the VAR(4).
is satisfied as all eigenvalues lie within the unit circle; thus, the system is sta-
tionary and consequently the impulse response functions are interpretable.
As it can be seen from Figure 2, shocks are persistent, however with time
they die away. Both the USGer3M and EUSWEC spreads are affected by
shocks induced by the LIBOR-OIS spread. If after some shocks the equilib-
rium errors return to zero, a long-run equilibrium among the LIBOR-OIS,
USGer3M and EUSWEC spreads exists.
The Granger causality test coefficients are presented in Table 3. The null
hypothesis that the EUSWEC does not Granger-cause LIBOR-OIS can be
rejected; similarly, the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the four lags
of the USGer3M in the equation for LIBOR-OIS are zero can be rejected.
Last, the null hypothesis that the USGer3M does not Granger-cause the
LIBOR-OIS can be rejected. For the third equation, the coefficients of both
endogenous variables are not jointly zero. Therefore, the null hypothesis that
the EUSWEC and USGer3M series do not Granger-cause the LIBOR-OIS
can be rejected.
The Cholesky decomposition is represented by the lower triangular A
matrix and B, a diagonal matrix, with the estimated values displayed in
19
  
Table 3: Granger causality Wald test coefficients.
Equation Excluded from equation chi2 df Prob. chi2
D USLIBOIS D.EUSWEC 284.79 4 0.000
D USLIBOIS D USGer3M 132.81 4 0.000
D USLIBOIS All 466.98 8 0.000
D EUSWEC D.USLIBOIS 18.65 4 0.001
D EUSWEC D.USGer3M 29.542 4 0.000
D EUSWEC All 55.165 8 0.000
D USGer3M D.USLIBOIS 13.893 4 0.008
D USGer3M D.EUSWEC 50.349 4 0.000
D USGer3M All 65.292 8 0.000
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Figure 3: Plot of the structural impulse responses.
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Equations 6 and 7. Since there are three variables, the number of restric-
tions is (32 − 3)/2 = 3. In the first equation, the restrictions imply that
the LIBOR-OIS equation does not contain contemporaneous EUSWEC and
USGer3M series; more precisely, it means that the LIBOR-OIS spread is not
contemporaneously affected by shocks originating from the EUSWEC and
USGer3M series correspondingly. In the second equation of matrix A, the
EUSWEC spread responds to changes in the LIBOR-OIS spread, but not to
contemporaneous changes in the USGer3M spread. In the third equation, the
USGer3M spread responds to contemporaneous changes in the LIBOR-OIS
and EUSWEC spread correspondingly:
A =
 1 0 0−0.0002 1 0
0.0013 −0.0969 1
 (6)
A zero restriction on the coefficients of the established variables is im-
posed. The matrix below displays the values representing the speed of ad-
justment to liquidity shocks. If the short-term interbank market is affected
by a liquidity shock, the LIBOR-OIS spread is a leader in moving back into
equilibrium, whereas the currency swap and the US-German bond spreads
are followers.
B =
2.686 0 00 0.0176 0
0 0 0.0613
 (7)
The results with the values of the Cholesky decomposition are presented
in Table 4. A 1% increase in the current LIBOR-OIS spread affects the cur-
rent EUSWEC spread by 0.0005%, and 1% increase in the current LIBOR-
OIS spread affects the euro fixed-float OIS swap by 0.00171% and the US-
Ger3M spread by -0.00345%.
The forecast error variance decomposition calculated the fraction of the
movement in a sequence owing to its individual shocks reacting against shocks
of the other two time series. The results suggest that the euro fixed-float OIS
swap rate rises as the LIBOR-OIS spread increases. The US-German bond
spread is positively related to the currency euro fixed-float OIS swap rate and
negatively related to the LIBOR-OIS rate. The impulse response functions
presented in Figure 2 are consistent with these findings.
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Table 4: Estimates of the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of residuals.
Variable USLIBOIS EUSWEC USGer3M
LIBOR-OIS 2.69 0 0
EUSWEC 0.00054 0.0176 0
USGer3M -0.00345 0.00171 0.0613
4.3. Long-run relationships within the interbank market and structural breaks
The results presented in Table 5 reveal that there are cointegrating re-
lationships for the constant case, the restricted trend case, for the restricted
constant case and for the case when there is no trend nor a constant in the
equation. At r = 1, the trace statistic is below the 5% critical values for all
the three cases. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there is one cointegrat-
ing relationship in the system of equations cannot be rejected. The next step
is to fit a VECM for the identified cases (equation with constant, equation
with restricted trend, equation with restricted constant and no trend nor
a constant in the equation) and estimate the long-run and short-run coeffi-
cients. Vector error correction implies that a departure from equilibrium in
one period is corrected in the subsequent period; or more precisely, deviations
from the long-run equilibrium condition are introduced into the short-time
dynamics (Johansen, 1995). Basically, the VECM is formulated as the re-
sponse of the LIBOR-OIS and EUSWEC shocks to the USGer3M spreads,
and implies that the cointegrating vector reduces the series to stationarity.
The dependent variable is the three-month US-German bond spread based
on the Cholesky decomposition result, where the LIBOR-OIS spread became
the leader, while the EUSWEC and USGer3M spreads were followers in trans-
mitting liquidity shocks. The significant error correction coefficients (α) and
long-run cointegrating parameters are presented in Table 6. The lagged
terms’ significant coefficients signal short-run causality in the equilibrium
model, while showing the speed of adjusting back to the equilibrium level.
All error correction terms (or adjustment coefficients) are significant at 10%
critical value. However, the estimated α’s are meaningful when the first er-
ror correction coefficient in the model takes a negative value. The restricted
trend equation does not fit, however in the unrestricted constant, restricted
constant and no trend no constant cases the models fit well. For these three
cases one can argue that there is a long-term causality running in both di-
rections between the USGer3M, LIBOR-OIS and EUSWEC spreads. For
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Table 5: Rank test for the eq. with constant (Panel A), eq. with trend (Panel B), equation
with restricted constant (Panel C), eq. with restricted trend (Panel D) and eq. with no
constant and no trend (Panel E), maxlag(4).
Rank Param LL eigenvalue trace stat. 5% crit. val.
Panel A
0 12 5663.80 . 310.64 29.68
1 17 5813.78 0.078 10.70* 15.41
2 20 5816.54 0.0015 5.17 3.76
3 21 5819.13 0.0014
Panel B
0 15 5664.04 . 354.38 34.55
1 20 5831.98 0.087 18.50 18.17
2 23 5838.78 0.0037 4.91 3.74
3 24 5841.23 0.0013
Panel C
0 9 5658.90 . 320.45 34.91
1 15 5813.45 0.081 11.35* 19.96
2 19 5816.53 0.0016 5.18 9.42
3 21 5819.13 0.0014
Panel D
0 12 5663.80 . 354.86 42.44
1 18 5831.81 0.087 18.84* 25.32
2 22 5838.60 0.0037 5.26 12.25
3 24 5841.23 0.0014
Panel E
0 9 5658.90 . 308.55 24.31
1 14 5808.57 0.078 9.21* 12.53
2 17 5811.59 0.0016 3.16 3.84
3 18 5813.18 0.0008
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Table 6: Estimates of the short-run VECM coefficients (α ’s) and long-run cointegrating
parameters (β’s).
Equation α β
Unrestricted Constant (-0.0002, 0.020, 0.0002) (1, -0.53, 3.24)
Restricted Trend (0.0003, -0.0234, -0.0002) (1, 0.599, -9.124)
Restricted Constant (-0.0002, 0.020, 0.0002) (1, -0.516, 3.157)
No Trend and Constant (-0.0004, 0.030, 0.0003) (1, -0.321, 3.061)
example, when the average three-month US-German bond spread is too high
(with the coeff. value of -0.0002), this will decrease back to the LIBOR-OIS
spread and euro fixed-float OIS swap level. In the no trend no constant case
the coefficient on the LIBOR-OIS spread is 0.030. This means that when the
average USGer3M spread is too high, the LIBOR-OIS spread level rapidly
adjusts (increases in this case) towards the USGer3M level, while at the same
time the USGer3M spread adjusts as well.
For all four equations, the estimated β’s, which represent the parameters
of the cointegrating relationships, are significant at 5% critical level. For the
unrestricted constant case, restricted constant case and for the no trend no
constant case, the long-run cointegrating equations are as follows:
yUSGer3M = 3.24 yEUSWEC − 0.53 yLIBOR−OIS (8)
yUSGer3M = 3.157 yEUSWEC − 0.516 yLIBOR−OIS (9)
yUSGer3M = 3.61 yEUSWEC − 0.321 yLIBOR−OIS (10)
Next, the specification of the three models that proved to fit well is tested.
A graph of the levels gives a guidance as to whether the estimated cointegrat-
ing equations are stationary. As it can be seen in Figure 4 (which represents
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Figure 4: Predicted cointegrating equation versus time for the unrestricted constant, re-
stricted constant and no trend and no constant cases.
the unrestricted constant, restricted constant and no trend and no constant
cases), there is a major and long-lasting break in the long-run relationship
which starts at the end of 2007. The timing corresponds to the start of the
financial crisis of 2007-08. Moreover, the graph tells us that the break lasted
approximately until the end of 2009.
The stability of the estimates are checked and all eigenvalues lie within
the unit circle, proving that the number of cointegrating equations were suc-
cessfully and correctly selected. The obtained cointegrated relationships are
used to generate forecast, and subsequently compare the variances of the
impulse responses obtained from the VAR(4) with the dynamic error fore-
casts obtained from the VECM. Significant distinctions are revealed. Earlier,
Figure 2 showed that the error forecasts from the first differenced station-
ary VAR(4) model converge to zero with time, whereas the dynamic error
forecasts in Figure 5 deviate towards infinity.
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Table 7: Results of the Gregory-Hansen tests of structural break in the level (A), level
shift with trend (B) and regime shift (C).
Test Stat. Break 1% crit. val. 5% crit. val. 10% crit. val.
(A)
ADF -3.64 719 -5.44 -4.92 -4.69
Zt -3.05 723 -5.44 -4.92 -4.69
Za -19.41 723 -57.01 -46.98 -42.49
(B)
ADF -7.56 1593 -6.45 -5.96 -5.72
Zt -7.26 1761 -6.45 -5.96 -5.72
Za -115.06 1761 -79.65 -68.43 -63.10
(C)
ADF -6.27 1469 -5.97 -5.50 -5.23
Zt -6.86 1463 -5.97 -5.50 -5.23
Za -205.69 1463 -68.21 -58.33 -52.85
These findings strongly indicate the presence of at least one structural
break in the time series. If structural changes occur at a single time t, these
will have an everlasting affect on the behaviour of the time series which is a
characteristic of unit root processes.
Table 7 reports the Gregory-Hansen test (1996) results which reveal
whether the established equilibrium relationships are disturbed by a one-
time structural break or regime change. t spans from 1st January 2002
to 31th December 2015, and t = 1, 2, . . . , 3651. At 5% significance, the
test for structural break in the level (A) does not confirm (for all three
test statistics: ADF, the Phillips Zα and Zt test statistics) that there is
a shift. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no cointegration with shift in
the level cannot be rejected. For the level shift with trend test (B), at 5%
significance, all of the tests statistics identify a structural change at time
t = 1593, t = 1761 and t = 1761, and this corresponds to 18th October
2007 and 30th September 2008. Similarly, for the regime shift test (C), all of
the three test statistics are significant at 5% significance level, therefore the
null hypothesis of no cointegration with regime change can be rejected. The
change dates are at t = 1469, t = 1463 and t = 1463, and correspond to the
9th of August 2007 and the 17th of August 2007. These dates are important
considering the fact that the first signs of a financial crisis looming in the
interbank market appeared in August 2007.
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5. Conclusions
From a policy perspective it is imperative to be able to forecast interest
rate movements caused by liquidity shocks within the interbank market. Our
study provides an insight into fundamental money market rates behaviour by
uncovering significant dependencies, inter-relationships and at the same time
tracing the path of structural innovations. The LIBOR-OIS, the euro fixed-
float OIS swap rate and the US-German bond spread move in a synchronised
fashion and this ultimately has implications for policy-makers and market
players alike. Impulse responses suggest that shocks affecting the interbank
market are meaningful and persistent, such that the USGer3M and EUSWEC
spreads are affected by shocks induced by the LIBOR-OIS spread indicating
endogenous responses and spillover effects within the short-term interbank
market. The variance decomposition calculates the fraction of the movement
in a sequence, owing to its individual shocks reacting against shocks of the
other two time series. If a liquidity shock affects the short-term interbank
market, the LIBOR-OIS spread is the leader, whereas the EUSWEC and
USGer3M spreads are followers in aligning back into equilibrium. Dynamic
forecasts indicated the presence of at least one structural break; thus, the
magnitude of shocks translating into structural breaks is large and infrequent,
and consequently the long-run relationships break down temporarily. The
structural break observed in the short-term interbank market on the 9th of
August 2007 coincides with BNP Paribas banks’ announcement that some of
its mortgage backed assets could not be valued. Uncertainty increased and
this was owed to the imminent liquidity shortage developed in money market,
which essentially was the start of the Financial crisis of 2007-08. Therefore,
this study shows evidence of early warning signals in the like of structural
liquidity shocks which can be detected in advance of financial crises.
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